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Abstract
Low pathogenic avian inﬂuenza (LPAI) has been assessed according to the criteria of the Animal Health
Law (AHL), in particular criteria of Article 7 on disease proﬁle and impacts, Article 5 on the eligibility of
LPAI to be listed, Article 9 for the categorisation of LPAI according to disease prevention and control
rules as in Annex IV and Article 8 on the list of animal species related to LPAI. The assessment has been
performed following a methodology composed of information collection and compilation, expert
judgement on each criterion at individual and, if no consensus was reached before, also at collective
levels. The output is composed of the categorical answer, and for the questions where no consensus was
reached, the different supporting views are reported. Details on the methodology used for this
assessment are explained in a separate opinion. According to the assessment performed, LPAI can be
considered eligible to be listed for Union intervention as laid down in Article 5(3) of the AHL. The disease
would comply with the criteria as in Sections 3 and 5 of Annex IV of the AHL, for the application of the
disease prevention and control rules referred to in points (c) and (e) of Article 9(1). The animal species
to be listed for LPAI according to Article 8(3) criteria are all species of domestic poultry and wild species
of mainly Anseriformes and Charadriiformes, as indicated in the present opinion.
© 2017 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by John Wiley and Sons Ltd on behalf
of European Food Safety Authority.
Keywords: avian inﬂuenza, LPAI, Animal Health Law, listing, categorisation, impact
Requestor: European Commission
Question number: EFSA-Q-2016-00599
Correspondence: alpha@efsa.europa.eu
EFSA Journal 2017;15(7):4891www.efsa.europa.eu/efsajournal
Panel members: Dominique Bicout, Anette Bøtner, Andrew Butterworth, Paolo Calistri, Klaus Depner,
Sandra Edwards, Bruno Garin-Bastuji, Margaret Good, Christian Gortazar Schmidt, Virginie Michel,
Miguel Angel Miranda, Simon More, Søren Saxmose Nielsen, Mohan Raj, Liisa Sihvonen, Hans Spoolder,
Jan Arend Stegeman, Hans-Hermann Thulke, Antonio Velarde, Preben Willeberg and Christoph
Winckler.
Acknowledgements: The Panel wishes to thank Ian Brown for the support provided to this scientiﬁc
output.
Suggested citation: EFSA AHAW Panel (EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Welfare), More S, Bøtner A,
Butterworth A, Calistri P, Depner K, Edwards S, Garin-Bastuji B, Good M, Gortazar Schmidt C, Michel V,
Miranda MA, Nielsen SS, Raj M, Sihvonen L, Spoolder H, Stegeman JA, Thulke H-H, Velarde A, Willeberg P,
Winckler C, Baldinelli F , Broglia A, Verdonck F, Beltran Beck B, Kohnle L, Morgado J and Bicout D, 2017.
Scientiﬁc Opinion on the assessment of listing and categorisation of animal diseases within the
framework of the Animal Health Law (Regulation (EU) No 2016/429): low pathogenic avian inﬂuenza.
EFSA Journal 2017;15(7):4891, 34 pp. https://doi.org/10.2903/j.efsa.2017.4891
ISSN: 1831-4732
© 2017 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by John Wiley and Sons Ltd on behalf
of European Food Safety Authority.
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivs License,
which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited and no
modiﬁcations or adaptations are made.
Reproduction of the images listed below is prohibited and permission must be sought directly from the
copyright holder:
Figure 1 (Annex): © World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE)
The EFSA Journal is a publication of the European Food
Safety Authority, an agency of the European Union.
AHL assessment on low pathogenic avian inﬂuenza
www.efsa.europa.eu/efsajournal 2 EFSA Journal 2017;15(7):4891
Table of contents
Abstract................................................................................................................................................... 1
1. Introduction................................................................................................................................ 4
1.1. Background and Terms of Reference as provided by the requestor.................................................. 4
1.2. Interpretation of the Terms of Reference....................................................................................... 4
3.1. Assessment according to Article 7 criteria...................................................................................... 4
3.1.1. Article 7(a) Disease Proﬁle ........................................................................................................... 4
3.1.1.1. Article 7(a)(i) Animal species concerned by the disease.................................................................. 4
3.1.1.2. Article 7(a)(ii) The morbidity and mortality rates of the disease in animal populations ...................... 6
3.1.1.3. Article 7(a)(iii) The zoonotic character of the disease ..................................................................... 9
3.1.1.4. Article 7(a)(iv) The resistance to treatments, including antimicrobial resistance................................ 9
3.1.1.5. Article 7(a)(v) The persistence of the disease in an animal population or the environment................ 9
3.1.1.6. Article 7(a)(vi) The routes and speed of transmission of the disease between animals, and, when
relevant, between animals and humans ....................................................................................... 11
3.1.1.7. Article 7(a)(vii) The absence or presence and distribution of the disease in the Union, and, where
the disease is not present in the Union, the risk of its introduction into the Union ....................... 13
3.1.1.8. Article 7(a)(viii) The existence of diagnostic and disease control tools ............................................. 15
3.1.2. Article 7(b) The impact of diseases ............................................................................................... 17
3.1.2.1. Article 7(b)(i) The impact of the disease on agricultural and aquaculture production and other parts
of the economy........................................................................................................................... 17
3.1.2.2. Article 7(b)(ii) The impact of the disease on human health............................................................. 17
3.1.2.3. Article 7(b)(iii) The impact of the disease on animal welfare ........................................................... 18
3.1.2.4. Article 7(b)(iv) The impact of the disease on biodiversity and the environment ................................ 18
3.1.3. Article 7(c) Its potential to generate a crisis situation and its potential use in bioterrorism ................ 19
3.1.4. Article 7(d) The feasibility, availability and effectiveness of the following disease prevention and control
measures.................................................................................................................................... 19
3.1.4.1. Article 7(d)(i) Diagnostic tools and capacities................................................................................. 19
3.1.4.2. Article 7(d)(ii) Vaccination ............................................................................................................ 19
3.1.4.3. Article 7(d)(iii) Medical treatments ................................................................................................ 20
3.1.4.4. Article 7(d)(iv) Biosecurity measures ............................................................................................. 20
3.1.4.5. Article 7(d)(v) Restrictions on the movement of animals and products............................................. 20
3.1.4.6. Article 7(d)(vi) Killing of animals ................................................................................................... 21
3.1.4.7. Article 7(d)(vii) Disposal of carcasses and other relevant animal by-products 22............................... 21
3.1.5. Article 7(e) The impact of disease prevention and control measures................................................ 22
3.1.5.1. Article 7(e)(i) The direct and indirect costs for the affected sectors and the economy as a whole...... 22
3.1.5.2. Article 7(e)(ii) The societal acceptance of disease prevention and control measures ......................... 22
3.1.5.3. Article 7(e)(iii) The welfare of affected subpopulations of kept and wild animals .............................. 22
3.1.5.4. Article 7(e)(iv) The environment and biodiversity ........................................................................... 23
3.2. Assessment according to Article 5 criteria...................................................................................... 23
3.2.1. Non-consensus questions............................................................................................................. 24
3.2.2. Outcome of the assessment of low pathogenic avian inﬂuenza according to criteria of Article 5(3) of
the AHL on its eligibility to be listed.............................................................................................. 24
3.3. Assessment according to Article 9 criteria...................................................................................... 24
3.3.1. Outcome of the assessment of criteria in Annex IV for LPAI for the purpose of categorisation as in
Article 9 of the AHL .................................................................................................................... 26
3.4. Assessment of Article 8................................................................................................................ 28
4. Conclusions................................................................................................................................. 30
References............................................................................................................................................... 30
Abbreviations ........................................................................................................................................... 34
AHL assessment on low pathogenic avian inﬂuenza
www.efsa.europa.eu/efsajournal 3 EFSA Journal 2017;15(7):4891
1. Introduction
1.1. Background and Terms of Reference as provided by the requestor
The background and Terms of Reference (ToR) as provided by the European Commission for the
present document are reported in section 1.2 of the scientiﬁc opinion on the ad hoc methodology
followed for the assessment of the disease to be listed and categorised according to the criteria of
Article 5, Annex IV according to Article 9 and Article 8 within the Animal Health Law (AHL) framework
(EFSA AHAW Panel, 2017b).
1.2. Interpretation of the Terms of Reference
The interpretation of the ToR is as in section 1.2 of the scientiﬁc opinion on the ad hoc
methodology followed for the assessment of the disease to be listed and categorised according to the
criteria of Article 5, Annex IV according to Article 9 and Article 8 within the AHL framework (EFSA
AHAW Panel, 2017b).
The present document reports the results of assessment on low pathogenic avian inﬂuenza (LPAI)
according to the criteria of the AHL articles as follows:
• Article 7: Low Pathogenic Avian Inﬂuenza proﬁle and impacts
• Article 5: eligibility of Low Pathogenic Avian Inﬂuenza to be listed
• Article 9: categorisation of Low Pathogenic Avian Inﬂuenza according to disease prevention
and control rules as in Annex IV
• Article 8: list of animal species related to Low Pathogenic Avian Inﬂuenza
2. Data and Methodologies
The methodology applied in this opinion is described in detail in a dedicated document about the
ad hoc method developed for assessing any animal disease for the listing and categorisation of
diseases within the AHL framework (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2017b).
3. Assessment
3.1. Assessment according to Article 7 criteria
This section presents the assessment of LPAI according to the Article 7 criteria of the AHL and
related parameters [see Table 2 of the opinion on methodology (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2017b)], based on
the information contained in the factsheet as drafted by the selected disease scientist (see section 2.1
of the scientiﬁc opinion on the ad hoc methodology) and amended by the AHAW Panel.
3.1.1. Article 7(a) disease proﬁle
The assessment focuses on H5 and H7 LPAI viruses (LPAIV) since they are internationally notiﬁable
and subject to legislative control (Directive 94/2005/EC1). The rationale for legislative control and
surveillance of H5/H7 LPAIV is to ensure effective control before they may mutate to highly pathogenic
avian inﬂuenza (HPAI) virus (HPAIV), which could have more severe consequences for veterinary
public health. In gathering evidence for the factsheet, some supporting material has been utilised,
based on biological ﬁndings of other LPAIV (subtypes other than H5/H7) which have common ecology
and biology.
3.1.1.1. Article 7(a)(i) Animal species concerned by the disease
Susceptible animal species
Parameter 1 – Naturally susceptible wildlife species (or family/orders)
Mainly Anseriformes and Charadriiformes (Daoust et al., 2011; Kuiken, 2013) have been reported
as LPAI-infected wild bird species (see Table 1). HPAIV have been detected in over a hundred species
of wild birds from at least 13 different orders (EFSA, 2006; EFSA AHAW Panel, 2017a). The LPAI
susceptibility of many wild bird species has not been assessed.
1 Directive 2005/94/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2005 on Community measures for the
control of avian inﬂuenza and repealing Directive 92/40/EEC. OJ L 10, 14.1.2006, p. 16–65.
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Parameter 2 – Naturally susceptible domestic species (or family/orders)
All species of domestic poultry, to include the family Phasianidae (chickens, turkeys and related
poultry such as quail and pheasant), Odontophoridae (quail), Numidae (guinea fowl) and Struthionidae
(ostriches) and also other birds native and introduced such as farmed Anseriformes, particularly
including ducks, geese and ratites are susceptible (Table 2). In general, viruses from birds rarely infect
mammals (reviewed in Swayne, 2016).
Parameter 3 – Experimentally susceptible wildlife species (or family/orders)
There is no additional information (see Table 1).
Parameter 4 – Experimentally susceptible domestic species (or family/orders)
Pigs, mustelid, horses, domestic carnivores (cats and dogs), seals and other sea mammals, rats,
rabbits, guinea pigs, mice and non-human primates have been infected experimentally (Short et al.,
2015) (Table 3).
Table 1: LPAIV-infected wild birds (based on Kuiken (2013) and Duncan et al. (2017); EMPRES-I,
online 2007–2017 data)
Common name (Latin name) Family Order
Ruddy turnstone (Arenaria interpres), common snipe (Gallinago
gallinago)
Scolopacidae Charadriiformes
Laughing gull (Leucophaeus atricilla), ring-billed gull (Larus
delawarensis), black-headed gull (Larus ridibundus), herring gull
(Larus argentatus), great black-backed gull (Larus marinus)
Laridae Charadriiformes
Pied avocet (Recurvirostra avosetta) Recurvirostridae Charadriiformes
mute swan (Cygnus olor), mallard (Anas platyrhynchos), northern
pintail (Anas acuta), northern shoveler (Anas clypeata), Canada goose
(Branta canadensis), tundra swan (Cygnus columbianus), Redhead
(Anas americana), wood duck (Anas sponsa), greater white-fronted
goose (Anas albifrons), common teal (Anas crecca), Eurasian wigeon
(Anas penelope), garganey (Anas querquedula), gadwall (Anas
strepera), greylag goose (Anser anser), lesser white-fronted goose
(Anser erythropus), bean goose (Anser fabalis), common pochard
(Aythya ferina), tufted duck (Aythya fuligula), ashy-headed goose
(Chloephaga poliocephala), whooper swan (Cygnus cygnus), harlequin
duck (Histrionicus histrionicus), ruddy duck (Oxyura jamaicensis),
common shelduck (Tadorna tadorna)
Anatidae Anseriformes
Common coot (Fulica atra) Rallidae Gruiformes
Black-crowned night heron (Nycticorax nycticorax) Ardeidae Pelecaniformes
Great cormorant (Phalacrocorax carbo) Phalacrocoracidae Suliformes
LPAIV: low pathogenic avian inﬂuenza virus; EMPRES-I: Global Animal Diseases Information System, Food Agriculture Organisation.
Table 2: Main domestic bird families susceptible to LPAIV
Common name Family Order
Chicken, turkey, quail (Old World species), pheasant Phasanidae Galliformes
Quail (New World species) Odontophoridae Galliformes
Guinea fowl Numididae Galliformes
Duck, geese Anatidae Anseriformes
Ostrich, ratites(a) Struthionidae Struthioniformes
LPAIV: low pathogenic avian inﬂuenza virus.
(a): Sometimes classiﬁed as a diverse group of large, ﬂightless birds of the infraclass Palaeognathae.
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Reservoir animal species
Parameter 5 – Wild reservoir species (or family/orders)
Wild water birds, in particular Anseriformes and Charadriiformes (Daoust et al., 2011; Kuiken, 2013;
Verhagen et al., 2014), are considered the main reservoir of LPAIV.
Parameter 6 – Domestic reservoir species (or family/orders)
No domestic species are reported as natural reservoirs and these become infected normally via
spillover from wild bird reservoir species (Swayne, 2016). In some ecosystems or situations (e.g. wild
bird markets, duck paddy ﬁeld systems), domestic ducks (Anseriformes) may maintain virus for long
periods. Also, domestic water bird populations (Anseriformes) could become reservoir.
3.1.1.2. Article 7(a)(ii) The morbidity and mortality rates of the disease in animal
populations
Morbidity
Parameter 1 – Prevalence/Incidence
EU Member States (MS) perform annual surveillance programmes in poultry, mainly using a risk-
based sampling approach. Table 4 indicates that the proportion of seropositive holdings was between
0.15% and 0.25% in the period 2010–2014. Positive samples were reported in 8–11 MS. Comparing
MS or poultry categories is not possible due to large variations in the number of samples per country
and per poultry category.
Table 3: Main domestic families/orders susceptible to LPAIV
Common name Family Order
Pig Suidae Artiodactyla
Horse Equidae Perissodactyla
Dog Canidae Carnivora
Cat Felidae Carnivora
Mustelid Mustelidae Carnivora
Seals and other sea mammals Enaliarctidae Carnivora
Rat, mouse Muridae Rodentia
Guinea pig Caviidae Rodentia
Non-human primates Several Primates
LPAIV: low pathogenic avian inﬂuenza viruses.
Table 4: LPAI serosurveillance data in number of holdings (%) (based on Annual EU surveillance
reports)
Category
Year
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Holdings sampled 29,484 29,806 29,404 25,220 19,813
H5 positive holdings 50 50 40 57 38
H7 positive holdings 14 15 4 6 5
Number Member States positive 8 10 9 11 8
Poultry category
Chicken breeders 1 2
Laying hens 4 4 4 1 4
Free range laying hens 1 1 3 7 4
Broilers
Fattening turkeys 1
Turkey breeders
Fattening ducks 6 7 8 11
AHL assessment on low pathogenic avian inﬂuenza
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LPAI has been detected in wild birds across the year and in several MS (Barral et al., 2008;
Busquets et al., 2010; Perez-Ramirez et al., 2010, 2012; Jurado-Tarifa et al., 2014; Latorre-Margalef
et al., 2014; Swieton et al., 2017). Furthermore, the maps in Figure 1 show that some regions had
seropositive holdings in 2014 and 2015. This was, for instance, the case in south-west France, where
new highly pathogenic H5 viruses emerged during winter 2015/16, which were never identiﬁed in wild
birds before (Briand et al., 2017).
Category
Year
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Breeder ducks 4 25 21 27 7
Fattening geese 22 2 1 1 2
Breeder geese 8 8 4 5 10
Backyard 4 8 1 3
Farmed game birds 15 3 1 2
Ratites 1
Other 5 6 7 2
LPAI: low pathogenic avian inﬂuenza.
The classiﬁcation of the intensity of surveillance is grouped by holdings sampled per 100 km2 Low: up to 10,
medium: 11–100, high: 101–500, very high: > 500
Figure 1: Map of the intensity of sampling in the EU AI poultry survey and holdings testing
serologically positive for H5 and H7 in 2014 and 2015 [taken from APHA (2015, 2016)]
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In the period 2007–2017, LPAI outbreaks were reported in 321 holdings located in 14 MS (Table 5).
The seroprevalence data and the outbreak data clearly show that LPAIV circulate every year in multiple
MS and mainly in ducks, geese and game birds.
Figure 1: (Continued)
Table 5: LPAI outbreaks within the EU (reported in ADNS between 1/1/ 2007 and 31/12/2016)
Country 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Grand
total
Germany 0 32 6 3 23 3 10 2 3 10 92
France 0 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 14 28 46
Italy 18 3 37 9 23 16 9 5 8 4 132
Netherlands 0 0 0 1 5 2 6 2 3 2 21
Belgium 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
United
Kingdom
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 4
Ireland 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Denmark 0 1 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 2 6
Spain 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2
Portugal 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Norway 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Czech
Republic
0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Bulgaria 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 6
Romania 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Grand total 24 39 50 17 57 22 27 9 29 47 321
LPAI: low pathogenic avian inﬂuenza; ADNS: Animal Disease Notiﬁcation System.
AHL assessment on low pathogenic avian inﬂuenza
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Parameter 2 – Case morbidity rate (% clinically diseased animals out of infected ones)
Morbidity of LPAI can be variable depending on the virus strain and poultry species. In ducks,
morbidity can be very low with subclinical infection due to localised enteric infection, whereas in
chicken layers it may be higher but inﬂuenced, for instance, by ﬂock size and density (Gonzales et al.,
2012a).
Mortality
Parameter 3 – Case fatality rate
In general, mortality due to LPAI is usually less than 5% in most avian species unless exacerbated
by secondary pathogens. Localised infection is normal, it remains enteric and respiratory (Swayne
et al., 2013).
3.1.1.3. Article 7(a)(iii) The zoonotic character of the disease
Presence
Parameter 1 – Report of zoonotic human cases (anywhere)
Humans can be infected with LPAIV such as H7N9. Rare mild zoonotic cases have been reported
principally with conjunctivitis and mild respiratory infection in humans occupationally exposed. The
number of reported H7N9 human cases worldwide in the period 2007–2016 is 1,157 (based on
EMPRES-I, online), of which two cases in the America and all the others in Asia. The majority of the
H7N9 human cases have been associated with direct or indirect contact with infected live or dead
poultry. There is no scientiﬁc evidence suggesting efﬁcient transmission of these viruses between
persons.
3.1.1.4. Article 7(a)(iv) The resistance to treatments, including antimicrobial resistance
Parameter 1 – Resistant strain to any treatment even at laboratory level
Amantadine resistance has been described in poultry in China and Egypt (Cheng et al., 2009;
Zaraket et al., 2010; CDC, 2017). A H7N9 virus isolated from a human case has been reported (ECDC,
online) to contain a mutation in the neuraminidase protein relevant for antiviral resistance against
oseltamivir and zanamivir.
3.1.1.5. Article 7(a)(v) The persistence of the disease in an animal population or the
environment
Animal population
Parameter 1 – Duration of infectious period in animals
The mean infectious period in individuals is 4–10, 7–8 and 5–8 days in chickens, turkeys and ducks,
respectively (Table 6).
AHL assessment on low pathogenic avian inﬂuenza
www.efsa.europa.eu/efsajournal 9 EFSA Journal 2017;15(7):4891
Parameter 2 – Presence and duration of latent infection period
Animal latent period up to 3 days depending on virus strain, infecting dose and species have been
reported; ﬂock level latency ranges 14 days (Swayne and Halvorson, 2008).
Parameter 3 – Presence and duration of the pathogen in healthy carriers
LPAIV infections may go unreported for some time (Marche et al., 2014). By deﬁnition most
populations are mildly affected (Daoust et al., 2013). In extreme circumstances, shedding in individual
birds has been recorded for up to 3–4 weeks in chickens, ducks and turkeys (Brown et al., 2012).
Environment
Parameter 4 – Length of survival (dpi) of the agent and/or detection of DNA in selected matrices (soil,
water, air) from the environment (scenarios: high and low T)
Survivability will depend on the virus strain and the substrate together with temperature, humidity
and pH. For example, at 4°C, the maximum resistance time varied between 18 and 176 days for 12
LPAIV of different H types (Brown et al., 2009). In general, viruses were most stable at slightly basic
pH (7.4–8.2), low temperatures (< 17°C) and fresh to brackish salinities. In faeces, 35 days at 4°C and
Table 6: LPAI infectious period in poultry (in days) (data received as per procurement, Erasmus
University Medical Centre, OC/EFSA/ALPHA2015/01, unpublished)
LPAI: low pathogenic avian inﬂuenza.
T = mean value of infectious period in days (mean, 95% lower conﬁdence limit and 95% upper conﬁdence limit)
AHL assessment on low pathogenic avian inﬂuenza
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7 days at 20°C; in water, up to 158 days at 17°C, whereas in manure and litter, 2–7 days; rapidly
inactivated in air less than 1 day due to desiccation (Keeler et al., 2012), low pH (< 5.0) or salinity
(EFSA, 2008; Swayne and Halvorson, 2008; Reis et al., 2012).
3.1.1.6. Article 7(a)(vi) The routes and speed of transmission of the disease between
animals, and, when relevant, between animals and humans
Routes of transmission
Parameter 1 – Types of routes of transmission from animal to animal (horizontal, vertical)
A comparison of the different transmission routes is provided in Table 7. Although differences
between isolates have been observed, results from Pillai et al. (2010) indicate that a poultry derived
isolate transmits better between chickens than a wild bird derived isolate. Wild bird isolates transmit
better among turkeys and ducks than among chickens. Once the virus is adapted to a species, it can
spread easily within ﬂocks. Infectious excretions are considered the most important source of virus
transmission between animals. Therefore, contaminated fomites are an important entry route for the
virus into poultry houses. Transmission of the virus via direct contact is considered less important than
via indirect contacts, both for domestic and wild birds. Vertical transmission has not been observed.
Parameter 2 – Types of routes of transmission between animals and humans (direct, indirect, including
foodborne)
Transmission is by direct exposure to aerosolised droplet materials in poultry environment through
the conjunctiva or the upper respiratory tract. Food is not considered a route of avian inﬂuenza virus
transmission to humans since acidic pH in the stomach and bile salts in the duodenum reduce the virus
infectivity (EFSA BIOHAZ Panel, 2010).
Speed of transmission
Parameter 3 – Incidence between animals and, when relevant, between animals and humans
Interspecies transmission can occur with high probability between animals of the same taxonomic
family such as chickens and turkeys (Pillai et al., 2010; Mughini-Gras et al., 2014); interspecies
transmission across different orders, such as duck to turkey is less likely (Mughini-Gras et al., 2014;
Claes et al., 2015) with even greater reduced efﬁciency between species of different classes, i.e. avian
to human.
Parameter 4 – Transmission rate (beta) (from R0 and infectious period) between animals and, when
relevant, between animals and humans
In chicken, the basic reproduction ratio, R0 (the average number of secondary infections caused by
one infectious bird introduced in a fully susceptible population), for LPAI ranges 0.8–9.1 (data received
as per procurement, Erasmus8University Medical Centre, OC/EFSA/ALPHA2015/01, unpublished). The
average infectious period of LPAI (Table 6) is considerably longer than that of HPAI, resulting in an
transmission rate parameter, b (the average number of secondary cases caused by one infectious
individual per day) at lower ranges for LPAI than for HPAI (0.1–2.46 and 0.76–4.5 respectively).
For turkeys, less information is available than for chicken, however, the trend appears similar to
that of chicken. Also, for ducks the information is limited, although it points towards higher
transmission parameters of LPAIV in ducks than in chickens (Table 8).
Table 7: LPAI transmission routes (Pantin-Jackwood et al., 2012; Claes et al., 2013, 2014)
Mode Chicken Turkey Duck
Horizontal intraspecies +++ +++ +++
Vertical _ _ _
Fomite ++ ++ ++
Wild bird origin + ++ +++
Horizontal interspecies + ++ ++
+++: highly efﬁcient; ++: effective; +: can occur, but low efﬁciency; –: not reported.
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Table 8: LPAI transmission rates (beta) between animals for viruses isolated from poultry (data
received as per procurement, Erasmus University Medical Centre, OC/EFSA/ALPHA2015/01,
unpublished)
LPAI: low pathogenic avian inﬂuenza.
Mean, 95% lower conﬁdence limit and 95% upper conﬁdence limit.
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3.1.1.7. Article 7(a)(vii) The absence or presence and distribution of the disease in the
Union, and, where the disease is not present in the Union, the risk of its
introduction into the Union
Presence and distribution
Parameter 1 – Map where the disease is present in the European Union (EU) (Figure 2)
Parameter 2 – Type of epidemiological occurrence (sporadic, epidemic, endemic) at MS level
In the MS that reported LPAI outbreaks in the last 10 years, some had very few outbreaks (e.g.
only in a period of one or two years), whereas others reported outbreaks every year (see Table 5). In
some cases, the sporadic outbreaks lead to wider epidemics, e.g. H7N7 Germany 2011 (Probst et al.,
2012), H7N1 Italy 1999–2000 (Capua et al., 2002).
Risk of introduction
Parameter 3 – Routes of possible introduction
The disease could be introduced by several routes (EFSA, 2008):
1) Introduced by migration of wild birds. Infected migratory and indigenous wild birds are the
most likely source of the virus for poultry in the EU. Direct contact with secretions and
excretions, especially faeces, and possibly aerosol transmission from infected birds over short
(few metres) distances (Jonges et al., 2015). At-risk matrices are contaminated feed, water,
premises, human clothing, etc.
Usually by the introduction of infective faeces, e.g. on boots, clothing, vehicles, egg trays, birds
cages or other fomites (feed and water contaminated by infective faeces have been shown to be
responsible for introduction).
Figure 2: H5 and H7 LPAI outbreaks in poultry holdings and captive birds reported in ADNS between
2007 and 2016
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2) Outbreak of disease in a territory of a trading partner and infected birds or contaminated
products imported that then may infect local birds:
• high risk with import of live affected birds;
• negligible risk with import of commodities or meat (Zepeda and Salman, 2007; Cobb,
2011);
• very low risk with import of eggs and egg products, providing eggs are sanitised (Cobb,
2011; Post et al., 2013; OIE, 2017).
There may be a risk if live birds are imported from affected countries where infection has been
acquired after certiﬁcation on premises of origin. Although this is considered a low probability event,
for example the mean annual probability for HPAI introduction into Poland by legal trade was
considered to be one outbreak in every 326 years (Gierak et al., 2016).
3) Illegal importation of birds from areas where disease is present.
Parameter 4 – Number of animal moving and/or shipment size
It was not possible to source reliable data within the time frame of this mandate. An overview will
be provided in the scientiﬁc opinion on avian inﬂuenza that is scheduled for adoption in September
2017.
Parameter 5 – Duration of infectious period in animal and/or commodity
The duration of the infectious period in animals is described under parameter 1 of Article 7(a)(v)
(see Section 3.1.1.5). The risk related to commodities is mainly due to contamination with (faecal)
excretions. Survival of LPAIV will depend on temperature, humidity and pH as described under
parameter 4 of Article 7(a)(v) (see Section 3.1.1.5).
Parameter 6 – List of control measures at border (testing, quarantine, etc.)
Legislation on imports of live poultry, day-old chicks and hatching eggs, table eggs, egg products
and the meat of game birds and poultry is laid down in Regulation (EC) No 798/20082. This includes a
list of approved countries for which there are certiﬁcates to allow the import of such consignments.
Some countries are regionalised, some have special additional measures.
Once the consignments are imported into the EU, the Regulation requires that the birds be kept at
the destination for a minimum of 3 weeks with sampling and (negative) testing for AI, during which
time there is also monitoring for clinical signs.
The OIE Terrestrial Code chapter 10.4 (2010) describes the recommendations for importation of live
birds other than poultry. In essence, regardless of the avian inﬂuenza status of the country of origin,
an international veterinary certiﬁcate is required, attesting: (i) that the birds showed no clinical sign of
avian inﬂuenza infection at the day of shipment, (ii) that the birds were kept in isolation since they
were hatched or for at least 21 days prior to shipment and showed no clinical signs of avian inﬂuenza,
(iii) that a statistically valid sample of the birds was tested to demonstrate freedom from avian
inﬂuenza infection, (iv) that the birds are transported in new or appropriately sanitised containers.
EU rules are in place for the movement of pet birds (i.e. accompanied by their owner) or birds which
are destined for special breeding programmes or for Approved Bodies (Council Directive 92/65/EEC3)
into the Union.
Import into the EU of poultry meat is according to Regulation (EC) 798/2011. It is allowed to trade
poultry meat from a country, zone or compartment affected by LPAI if the animals did not show any
sign suggestive of AI infection during ante and post mortem inspection.
For the importation of egg products of poultry, regardless of the AI status of the country of origin,
the commodity fulﬁls the requirements for importation of eggs for human consumption or the
commodity has been processed to ensure the destruction of AI (heat inactivation achieving a 7-log
reduction of AI, see OIE Code Article 10.4.25 for technical information) and contact with any source of
AIV is prevented.
2 Regulation (EC) No 798/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 August 2008 laying down a list of third
countries, territories, zones or compartments from which poultry and poultry products may be imported into and transit
through the Community and the veterinary certiﬁcation requirements. OJ L 226, 23.8.2008, p. 1–94.
3 Council Directive 92/65/EEC of 13 July 1992 laying down animal health requirements governing trade in and imports into the
Community of animals, semen, ova and embryos not subject to animal health requirements laid down in speciﬁc Community
rules referred to in Annex A (I) to Directive 90/425/EEC. OJ L 268, 14.9.1992, p. 54–72.
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For imports into the Union of feathers and down, Regulation (EC) No 142/20114 applies, requiring a
prohibition on the import of untreated feather or down, while treated feathers and down (hot steam at
100°C for 30 min) may be placed on the market with no restrictions.
A list of control measures implemented in third countries or at the EU border related to import of
live birds and commodities is provided in Table 9.
Parameter 7 – Presence and duration of latent infection and/or carrier status
See Section 3.1.1.5.
3.1.1.8. Article 7(a)(viii) The existence of diagnostic and disease control tools
Diagnostic tools
Parameter 1 – Existence of diagnostic tools
The avian inﬂuenza diagnostic tools are described in the Commission Decision 2006/437/EC5. In
addition, there are speciﬁed laboratory manuals in the EU, Regulation (EC) No 2006/4376 applies, and
at global level (OIE, 2017). Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) is used to determine the presence of
LPAIV in suspected samples of live animals, commodities or environmental samples. The sensitivity and
speciﬁcity varies depending on the virus subtype and the analysed matrix. Virus isolation is required for
detailed analysis of a virus and is done with one or a few isolates per outbreak or epidemic.
Sequencing is used to analyse the relation with other circulating viruses. The intravenous pathogenicity
test (IVPI) is used to determine the pathogenicity level of a virus. Haemagglutination inhibition (HI)
and enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) are used in seroprevalence studies. An overview of
the available tools is provided in Table 10.
Table 9: List of control measures at the border related to import of live birds and commodities
Item Measure
Live birds Pre-inspection at origin, certiﬁcation, veterinary inspection
Hatching eggs Pre-inspection at origin, certiﬁcation, veterinary inspection
Day-old chicks Pre-inspection at origin, certiﬁcation, veterinary inspection
Animal products Certiﬁcation, third country inspections for assurance (as required)
Captive birds Certiﬁcation, quarantine, testing
Table 10: Overview of AI diagnostic tools
Method
Test
performance
Purpose
Sample
type
Reference
Dse Dsp
Population
freedom
Animal
freedom
Disease
conﬁrmation
Surveillance
inc post
vacc
Detection/
culture
Virus isolation*
+ +++ +++ + Tissues
C&O
swabs
(Commission
Decision
2006/437/EC)
PCR (real-time)1 NK NK NK NK NK NK Tissues
C&O
swabs
(Commission
Decision
2006/437/EC)
4 Regulation (EC) No 142/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 February 2011 implementing Regulation
(EC) No 1069/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down health rules as regards animal by-products and
derived products not intended for human consumption and implementing Council Directive 97/78/EC as regards certain
samples and items exempt from veterinary checks at the border under that Directive. OJ L 54, 26.2.2011, p. 1–254.
5 Commission Decision of 4 August 2006 approving a Diagnostic Manual for avian inﬂuenza as provided for in Council Directive
2005/94/EC. OJ L 237, 31.8.2006, p. 1–27.
6 Regulation (EC) No 2006/437 of the European Commission of 4 August 2006 approving a diagnostic manual for avian inﬂuenza
as provided for in Council Directive 2005/94/EC. OJ L 237, 31.8.2006, p. 1–27.
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Control tools
Parameter 2 – Existence of control tools
The control measures for avian inﬂuenza mainly aim to prevent virus spread to other poultry
holdings. The measures are described in Council Directive 2005/94/EC7 and an overview is presented
in Table 11. In case of a LPAI outbreak, the competent authority shall immediately establish a
restricted zone with a radius of at least 1 km around the holding. An inventory is made of the animals
present on the affected holding and the animals should be brought and kept inside. No carcasses,
meat, animal by-products, manure, slurry used litter or anything likely to transmit LPAIV may leave the
holding without authorisation. Furthermore, an epidemiological investigation is performed. Holdings in
which infection with LPAIV has been conﬁrmed are depopulated, followed by cleaning and disinfection
of the houses and equipment. Poultry and eggs cannot be moved until the risk of LPAI spread is
determined as minimal. Hatching eggs are put under surveillance. Persons entering or leaving the
holding and transport vehicles have to follow speciﬁc biosecurity requirements aiming to prevent the
spread of the virus. Preventive or emergency vaccination is possible although only used in few cases8
(e.g. in Italy between 2000 and 2008 and in Portugal between 2007 and 2011) (Capua and Marangon,
2006). Repopulation is done in a controlled manner.
Method
Test
performance
Purpose
Sample
type
Reference
Dse Dsp
Population
freedom
Animal
freedom
Disease
conﬁrmation
Surveillance
inc post
vacc
Inﬂuenza A NK NK ++ +++ +++ ++ Tissues
C&O
swabs
(Commission
Decision
2006/437/EC;
Slomka et al.,
2010)
H5 100% – ++ +++ +++ ++ Tissues
C&O
swabs
(Commission
Decision
2006/437/EC;
Slomka et al.,
2007)
H7 100% 90% ++ +++ +++ ++ Tissues
C&O
swabs
(Commission
Decision
2006/437/EC;
Slomka et al.,
2009)
Immune
response
HI
– – +++ ++ ++
convalescent
+++ Serum (Commission
Decision
2006/437/EC)
ELISA NK NK + + +
convalescent
++ Serum (Marche and van
den Berg, 2010;
OIE, 2017)
Virus
characterisation
gene sequencing
NK 100% – – +++ – Tissue /
swab or
virus
(OIE, 2017)
IVPI – – – – +++ – Virus (OIE, 2017)
C&O swabs: cloacal and oropharyngeal swabs.
NK: not known; HI, haemagglutination inhibition test; IVPI, intravenous pathogenicity index.
*Gold standard but proven to be less sensitive and furthermore, real-time PCR reactors speciﬁc from known population.
1Senstivity (Dse) and speciﬁcity (Dsp) values measured against virus isolation.
7 Council Directive 2005/94/EC of 20 December 2005 on Community measures for the control of avian inﬂuenza and repealing
Directive 92/40/EEC. OJ L 10, 14.1.2006, p. 16-65.
8 https://ec.europa.eu/food/animals/animal-diseases/control-measures/avian-influenza_en
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3.1.2. Article 7(b) The impact of diseases
3.1.2.1. Article 7(b)(i) The impact of the disease on agricultural and aquaculture
production and other parts of the economy
The level of presence of the disease in the Union
Parameter 1 – Number of MSs where the disease is present
In the period 2007–2016, LPAI outbreaks were reported in 14 MS through ADNS (see Table 5). The
number of outbreaks per year ranged from 9 to 57 and reached a total of 321 in these 10 years.
The loss of production due to the disease
Parameter 2 – Proportion of production losses (%) by epidemic/endemic situation
Morbidity and mortality of LPAI in poultry is limited, as described in Section 3.1.1.2. The main loss
due to LPAI is the depopulation of affected holdings. In the period 2007–2016, 1.7 9 106 poultry were
culled within the EU (see Table 12). Additional losses are related to movement restrictions, which lead
to economic loss of table eggs, hatching eggs and live animals. Indirect costs are for instance trade
bans to third countries, treatment and removal of manure and wash water, closing of processing
plants. The estimated total economic cost of the LPAI epidemic in Italy in 1999 was about 507 million
euro (112 and 395 million euro direct and indirect costs respectively) (Sartore et al., 2010). The total
cost for ﬁve subsequent LPAI outbreaks in Italy was estimated around 143 million euro.
Table 11: Available control measures for avian inﬂuenza
Measure Application
Farm restrictions Live birds, hatching eggs, meat, animal by-products, table eggs, equipment,
vehicles, people, slurry/manure, litter
Zoning/quarantine/surveillance 1 km protection zone, farm census/inspection, laboratory testing of farms
Movement restrictions Live birds, hatching eggs, meat, animal by-products, table eggs
Culling and disposal Infected farm
Biosecurity Speciﬁed requirements
Transport Speciﬁed requirements
Epidemiological enquiry Determine spread, identify source
Cleansing and disinfection Speciﬁed requirements
Vaccination Exceptional use
Repopulation Controlled
Table 12: Overview of diseased, dead and culled poultry due to LPAI outbreaks reported in ADNS
between 2007 and 2016
Diseased poultry Dead poultry Culled poultry Grand total
2007 31,776 3,491 126,398 161,665
2008 452 8,199 358,724 367,375
2009 355 572 176,327 177,254
2010 2,093 1 55,527 57,621
2011 51,955 201 308,457 360,613
2012 103,390 148 221,970 325,508
2013 11,973 135 135,689 147,797
2014 186 50 50,300 50,536
2015 11,282 152 69,767 81,201
2016 236 5 21,568 21,809
Grand total 213,698 12,954 1,524,727 1,751,379
LPAI: low pathogenic avian inﬂuenza.
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3.1.2.2. Article 7(b)(ii) The impact of the disease on human health
Transmissibility between animals and humans
Parameter 1 – Types of routes of transmission between animals and humans
Avian inﬂuenza viruses do not readily infect people, but can do so when people have close contact
with infected birds or exposure to high viral loads in untreated products. The illness caused by avian
inﬂuenza viruses can present itself as a ﬂu-like respiratory illness or conjunctivitis (Kim et al., 2016).
Parameter 2 - Incidence of zoonotic cases
With increased awareness that AI viruses can infect humans, investigations of human contacts
during poultry outbreaks with LPAI have detected a small number of human cases. Poor
transmissibility to humans with most LPAIV has been reported with only four human cases reported in
Europe (Kim et al., 2016; Table 4). One exception is an H7N9 LPAIV conﬁned to China that has caused
1,157 human cases since 2013 with approximately 30% mortality (WHO, 2015). The composition of
this virus is entirely distinct from viruses circulating in European poultry and wild birds.
Transmissibility between humans
Parameter 3 – Human to human transmission is sufﬁcient to sustain sporadic cases or community-level
outbreak
LPAIV lacks human to human transmissibility.
Parameter 4 – Sporadic, endemic, epidemic or pandemic potential
Only four human cases have been reported in Europe, nonetheless, there is theoretical pandemic
potential.
The availability of effective prevention or medical treatment in humans
Parameter 6 – Availability of medical treatment and their effectiveness (therapeutic effect and any
resistance)
Antiviral drugs are available but some levels of resistance are reported. These drugs are effective
only if taken early in the infection course (Loregian et al., 2014).
Parameter 7 – Availability of vaccines and their effectiveness (reduced morbidity)
Vaccines are not routinely available for human application. WHO has pre-pandemic vaccine stock
containing some LPAIV strains for rapid production, if a pandemic were to emerge from an LPAI virus
(WHO, 2015).
3.1.2.3. Article 7(b)(iii) The impact of the disease on animal welfare
Parameter 1 – Severity of clinical signs at case level and related level and duration of impairment
Clinical signs, as deﬁned above, are usually very mild, i.e. laying birds going out of lay so the
impact is very low unless exacerbated by secondary infections. Low levels of mortality can occur in
susceptible species.
3.1.2.4. Article 7(b)(iv) The impact of the disease on biodiversity and the environment
Biodiversity
Parameter 1 – Endangered wild species affected: listed species as in CITES and/or IUCN list
Not applicable as LPAI in wild species is usually asymptomatic.
Environment
Parameter 3 – Capacity of the pathogen to persist in the environment and cause mortality in wildlife
While the pathogen can survive in the environment, it presents no risk to wildlife in terms of
mortality.
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3.1.3. Article 7(c) Its potential to generate a crisis situation and its potential use
in bioterrorism
Parameter 1 – Listed in OIE/CFSPH classiﬁcation of pathogens
It is listed.
Parameter 2 – Listed in the Encyclopaedia of Bioterrorism Defence of Australia Group
It is not listed.
Parameter 3 – Included in any other list of potential bio-agroterrorism agents
It is not listed.
3.1.4. Article 7(d) The feasibility, availability and effectiveness of the following
disease prevention and control measures
3.1.4.1. Article 7(d)(i) Diagnostic tools and capacities
See Section 3.1.1.8 and Table 10 which provides summary data for all three aspects.
3.1.4.2. Article 7(d)(ii) Vaccination
There are ﬁve vaccines available for LPAI in poultry, which reduce viral shedding. The duration of
protection varies from 14 weeks to 12 months in chicken and 14 weeks in ducks. All vaccines comply
to the DIVA principle, as required by the EU legislation. Table 13 (FAO, 2009; EMA, 2010; Discontools,
2016) provides an overview of the vaccine characteristics (Marangon et al., 2003; Busani et al., 2007;
Capua et al., 2009; Beato et al., 2014).
Feasibility
Parameter 5 – Way of administration
Vaccinations by commercially available vaccines are carried out by injection (IM or SC).
Table 13: LPAI vaccine availability and effectiveness1
Vaccine
Type/
administration
Effectiveness Field protection
Duration of
protection
Diva
Availability/
production
capacity*
Nobilis ﬂu
H5N22
Inactivated
IM and SC
Reduced clinical
signs and viral
shedding
n/a 12 months in
chicken
Y3 Y
Capacity
unknown
Nobilis ﬂu
H7N1/
H7N7
Inactivated
IM and SC
Reduced clinical
signs and viral
shedding
Italy 2002–2003
R0 2.9 pre-vaccination
to 0.6 post-
vaccination
45 weeks Y3 Y
Capacity
unknown
Poulvac
Flu-Fend
H5N3
Inactivated
IM and SC
Reduced clinical
signs and viral
shedding
n/a 14 weeks in
ducks
Y3 Y
Capacity
unknown
Merial
Trovac
H5
Vectored HA
insert
SC
Reduced clinical
signs and viral
shedding
n/a 20 weeks in
chicken
Y Y
Capacity
unknown
Gallimune
H5N9 or
H7N1
Inactivated
IM and SC
Reduced clinical
signs and viral
shedding
n/a Not known Y3 Y
Capacity
unknown
SC: subcutaneous; IM: intramuscular.
1Note this is not an exhaustive list of vaccines, but it indicates some vaccines historically used in the EU.
2EMA authorisation.
3Companion diagnostics not on the shelf.
*Commercial suppliers tailor supply to demand.
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3.1.4.3. Article 7(d)(iii) Medical treatments
Antiviral drugs are prohibited for application in the veterinary sector and therefore this section is
not applicable.
3.1.4.4. Article 7(d)(iv) Biosecurity measures
Availability
Parameter 1 – Available biosecurity measures
Procedures or practices that prevent or limit exposure to LPAIV include farm hygiene, environmental
control, medication to prevent secondary challenge and effective sanitation. Key elements are farm
location to mitigate risk for introduction, farm design, access control of people and vehicles, sanitation of
materials entering and leaving the site including equipment, litter, vermin control, limiting access to wild
birds or their faeces when birds are kept outdoors, water sanitation, physical barriers to poultry house,
including boot changes and protective clothing, quarantine new stock, exclude access of wild birds to
feed and litter disposal (Lister, 2008; EFSA AHAW Panel, 2017a,b).
Effectiveness
Parameter 2 – Effectiveness of biosecurity measures in preventing the pathogen introduction
A combination of factors will provide effective biosecurity, but key elements include limiting access
for wild birds and reducing fomite transmission risk through effective sanitisation when entering into
poultry houses. In some systems, mitigation of access to wild bird or their faeces, e.g. in outdoor
system can be achieved by ensuring that feed is not readily accessible or by limiting the access to
outdoor range by wild birds (by nets or fences). Appropriate management to monitor changes in
production and ﬂock health are critical for prompt awareness of early indicators of infection, i.e. more
than 20% reduction in feed or water intake or more than 5% of egg drop for more than 2 days in
laying birds (Annex II to Decision 2005/734/EC). Implementation of biosecurity measures is key to
disease prevention/control (Gonzales et al., 2014).
Feasibility
Parameter 3 – Feasibility of biosecurity measure
In large-scale integrated commercial operations, biosecurity programmes are a usual part of
business. However, in other production systems, such as outdoor rearing, implementation of
biosecurity measures is more challenging and only limited elements in practice can be applied. The
introduction of LPAIV almost always can be attributed to failures in application of biosecurity measures
or direct contact with wild birds or their faeces. In reality, when the disease threat is perceived to
increase, measures are strengthened but may be relaxed in lower risk periods.
3.1.4.5. Article 7(d)(v) Restrictions on the movement of animals and products
Availability
Parameter 1 – Available movement restriction measures
See Table 11, Section 3.1.1.8.
Effectiveness
Parameter 2 – Effectiveness of restriction of animal movement in preventing the between farm spread
Proven in EU; when applied promptly and coupled with early reporting, disease spread is mitigated.
Between-farm spread of LPAI is generally low in the absence of control measures, dependent on the
species, e.g. duck sector.
Feasibility
Parameter 3 – Feasibility of restriction of animal movement
Appropriate veterinary infrastructure is in place in the MSs to comply. The implementation of
movement restrictions is feasible because risk-based derogations are permitted.
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3.1.4.6. Article 7(d)(vi) Killing of animals
Availability
Parameter 1 – Available methods for killing animals
Controlled through Regulation (EC) No 1099/20099 under which the Competent Authority can
derogate the method of killing ‘where it considers that compliance is likely to affect human health or
signiﬁcantly slow down the process of eradication of a disease’. Multiple methods are available
principally on site to include gassing in containers and use of anoxic foam on site or through safe
transport to slaughterhouse where a veterinary risk assessment deems the risk of spreading the virus
to be very low. LPAI killed birds, provided that they are properly labelled, are ﬁt for entering the food
chain.
Effectiveness
Parameter 2 – Effectiveness of killing animals (at farm level or within the farm) for reducing/stopping
spread of the disease
It is highly effective to kill animals on site, and mitigating the risk for transport of animals away
from infected premise contributes to reducing or stopping disease spread, which needs to be done in a
controlled environment to avoid aerosols and local windborne spread of virus. Attention has to be paid
to secure the transportation of dead animals.
Feasibility
Parameter 3 – Feasibility of killing animals
Logistical challenges and R0 values will depend on speed of slaughter; to reduce risk for a fast-
spreading outbreak-infected ﬂocks must be culled quickly, ideally within 48 hours of diagnosis.
Logistical challenges in some operational settings, such as outdoor production, where for moderately
small (juvenile) populations manual neck dislocation is an option. Contingency plans are required
under Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009. These plans need to factor in animal welfare (humane culling
methods), public health risk (by not killing out fast and use methods to reduce exposure) and
personnel safety, practicality of measures applied and speed and all should be under ofﬁcial veterinary
supervision.
3.1.4.7. Article 7(d)(vii) Disposal of carcasses and other relevant animal by-products
Availability
Parameter 1 – Available disposal option
Disposal options for poultry carcases and associated wastes are: commercial ﬁxed plant incineration,
rendering (category 1 and 2 Animal By-Product Regulation approved), permitted commercial landﬁll
sites.
Effectiveness
Parameter 2 – Effectiveness of disposal option
Incineration and rendering are closed systems that produce an effective inactivation of LPAIV.
Landﬁll may not inactivate all pathogens but could be used only for non-infected carcases.
Feasibility
Parameter 3 – Feasibility of disposal option
Operational protocols for use of incineration, rendering and permitted landﬁll have been
successfully utilised in a number of exotic avian disease outbreaks.
9 Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 September 2009 on the protection of
animals at the time of killing. OJ L 303, 18.11.2009, p. 1–30.
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3.1.5. Article 7(e) The impact of disease prevention and control measures
3.1.5.1. Article 7(e)(i) The direct and indirect costs for the affected sectors and the
economy as a whole
Parameter 1 – Cost of control (e.g. treatment/vaccine, biosecurity)
This is difﬁcult to quantify, but signiﬁcant costs are linked with the implementation of biosecurity.
Nevertheless, the industry would need to deploy for good practice regardless of LPAI threat.
Parameter 2 – Cost of eradication (culling, compensation)
The economic burden for ﬁve successive LPAI epidemics in Italy was estimated €143 million (€105
million in direct losses and €38 million in consequential losses) (Sartore et al., 2010). There were no
other data identiﬁed regarding LPAI culling and/or compensation. Eradication of LPAI is not an
objective.
Parameter 3 – Cost of surveillance and monitoring
Since 2003, MS have the obligation (Council Directive 2005/94/EC) to carry out surveillance
programmes in poultry aiming to detect LPAI H5 and H7 viruses which have the potential to mutate to
HPAI. Based on MS’ programmes submitted for EU co-ﬁnancing, a cost of approximately €4.3 million
per annum is estimated (based on last 3 years). The cost of a surveillance programme is also
dependent on its design (Rutten et al., 2012). LPAI surveillance in wild birds is not performed.
Parameter 4 – Trade loss (bans, embargoes, sanctions) by animal product
Information not logged with Commission services. No relevant data could be identiﬁed.
Parameter 5 – Importance of the disease for the affected sector (% loss or euro lost compared to
business amount of the sector
It is difﬁcult to estimate the loss for the sector in the EU since the loss is different between MS and
one needs to differentiate between the trade in hatching eggs and day-old chicks that may be
differentiated too as there are chicks at different stages from great grandparent, parent and broiler.
3.1.5.2. Article 7(e)(ii) The societal acceptance of disease prevention and control
measures
There is little information on case studies relating to LPAI more conversely with HPAI, however,
culling of affected ﬂocks raises societal issues and a perceived lack of vaccination to control. In an EU
context, there are very limited episodes of extensive LPAI spread and these primarily occurred before
formal notiﬁcation and control tools were implemented. Some pressure has come from welfare sectors
to quarantine-infected birds until infection is resolved. Possibilities do exist, but the rationale for control
of LPAI by culling is to reduce risk of virus mutation to the more impactful HPAI.
3.1.5.3. Article 7(e)(iii) The welfare of affected subpopulations of kept and wild animals
Parameter 1 – Welfare impact of control measures on domestic animals
For every outbreak, an assessment will be made when putting restrictions in place that will consider
animal welfare implications; where animal welfare is compromised, and there is no alternative, culling
will be considered as a mechanism to prevent animal suffering. Movement restriction can lead to
overcrowding, i.e. broilers but derogations are available to alleviate this on welfare grounds without
overt disease risk. As part of the mechanism to set up biosecurity measures EU MS’s factor animal
welfare considerations, i.e. conﬁning some ducks indoors is unacceptable and options exist to permit
some outdoor access by use of netting (OIE, 2017).
Parameter 2 – Wildlife depopulation as control measure
It is not practised.
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3.1.5.4. Article 7(e)(iv) The environment and biodiversity
Environment
Parameter 1 – Use and potential residuals of biocides or medical drugs in environmental compartments
(soil, water, feed, manure)
They are not used.
Biodiversity
Parameter 2 – Mortality in wild species
LPAI infections do not generally cause major clinical signs, nor do they cause mortality in wild birds
(Ferreira et al., 2010; Bertran et al., 2012; Kuiken, 2013).
3.2. Assessment according to Article 5 criteria
This section presents the results of the expert judgement on the criteria of Article 5 of the AHL
about LPAI (Table 14). The expert judgement was based on Individual and Collective Behavioural
Aggregation (ICBA) approach described in detail in the opinion on the methodology (EFSA AHAW
Panel, 2017a,b). Experts have been provided with information of the disease factsheet mapped into
Article 5 criteria (see supporting information, Annex A), based on that the experts indicate their Y/N or
‘na’ judgement on each criterion of Article 5, and the reasoning supporting their judgement. As from
the legal text of the AHL, a disease is considered eligible to be listed as laid down in Article 5 if it fulﬁls
all criteria of the ﬁrst set from A(i) to A(v) and at least one of the second set of criteria from B(i) to B
(v). According to the assessment methodology (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2017a,b), a criterion is considered
fulﬁlled when the outcome is ‘Yes’.
The minimum number of judges in the judgement was 10. The expert judgement was conducted
as described in the methodological opinion (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2017a,b). For details on the
interpretation of the questions, see Appendix B of the methodological opinion (EFSA AHAW Panel,
2017a,b).
Table 14: Outcome of the expert judgement on the Article 5 criteria for LPAI
Criteria to be met by the disease:
According to AHL, a disease shall be included in the list referred to in point (b) of paragraph 1 of
Article 5 if it has been assessed in accordance with Article 7 and meets all of the following criteria
Final
outcome
A(i) The disease is transmissible Y
A(ii) Animal species are either susceptible to the disease or vectors and reservoirs thereof exist
in the Union
Y
A(iii) The disease causes negative effects on animal health or poses a risk to public health due
to its zoonotic character
Y
A(iv) Diagnostic tools are available for the disease Y
A(v) Risk-mitigating measures and, where relevant, surveillance of the disease are effective and
proportionate to the risks posed by the disease in the Union
Y
At least one criterion to be met by the disease:
In addition to the criteria set out above at point A(i)–A(v), the disease needs to fulﬁl at least one of the following
criteria
B(i) The disease causes or could cause signiﬁcant negative effects in the Union on animal
health, or poses or could pose a signiﬁcant risk to public health due to its zoonotic
character
Y
B(ii) The disease agent has developed resistance to treatments and poses a signiﬁcant danger
to public and/or animal health in the Union
NC
B(iii) The disease causes or could cause a signiﬁcant negative economic impact affecting
agriculture or aquaculture production in the Union
Y
B(iv) The disease has the potential to generate a crisis or the disease agent could be used for
the purpose of bioterrorism
N
B(v) The disease has or could have a signiﬁcant negative impact on the environment, including
biodiversity, of the Union
N
Colour code: green = consensus (Yes/No); yellow = no consensus (NC)
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3.2.1. Non-consensus questions
This section displays the assessment related to each criterion of Article 5 where no consensus was
achieved in form of tables (Table 15). The proportion of Y, N or na answers are reported, followed by
the list of different supporting views for each answer.
Reasoning supporting the judgement
supporting yes:
• It is entirely plausible that resistance will increase, posing increasing dangers to public and/or
animal health, extrapolating from broader AMR experiences, problems of resistance will
increase.
• Resistance has been demonstrated in humans.
• The illegal use of antivirals could possibly cause resistance.
• Resistance has been demonstrated in Egypt and China.
supporting no:
• Resistance occurrence has been reported on two occasions with probable re-assortment, but
this seems not relevant for the EU.
• Possible resistance does not pose a signiﬁcant danger to public health because symptoms in
humans are usually mild and often not treated.
• There is no treatment in poultry in the EU. It is not indicated and too expensive.
• Resistance has only been described in human strains.
3.2.2. Outcome of the assessment of LPAI according to criteria of Article 5(3) of
the AHL on its eligibility to be listed
As from the legal text of the AHL, a disease is considered eligible to be listed as laid down in Article
5 if it fulﬁls all criteria of the ﬁrst set from A(i) to A(v) and at least one of the second set of criteria
from B(i) to B(v). According to the assessment methodology (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2017a,b), a criterion
is considered fulﬁlled when the outcome is ‘yes’. According to the results shown in Table 14, LPAI
complies with all criteria of the ﬁrst set and with two criteria of the second set, therefore it is
considered eligible to be listed as laid down in Article 5 of the AHL.
3.3. Assessment according to Article 9 criteria
This section presents the results of the expert judgement on the criteria of Annex IV referring to
categories as in Article 9 of the AHL about LPAI (Tables 16–20). The expert judgement was based on
ICBA approach described in detail in the opinion on the methodology. Experts have been provided with
information of the disease factsheet mapped into Article 9 criteria (see supporting information, Annex
A), based on that the experts indicate their Y/N or ‘na’ judgement on each criterion of Article 9, and
the reasoning supporting their judgement. The minimum number of judges in the judgement was 10.
The expert judgement was conducted as described in the methodological opinion (EFSA AHAW Panel,
2017a,b). For details on the interpretation of the questions, see Appendix B of the methodological
opinion (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2017a,b).
Table 15: Outcome of the expert judgement related to criterion 5 B(ii)
Question
Final
outcome
Response
Y (%) N (%) na (%)
B(ii) The disease agent has developed resistance to treatments and
poses a signiﬁcant danger to public and/or animal health in the
Union
NC 30 70 0
NC: non-consensus; number of judges: 10.
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Table 16: Outcome of the expert judgement related to the criteria of section 1 of Annex IV
(category A of Article 9) for LPAI (CI = current impact; PI = potential impact)
Criteria to be met by the disease:
The disease needs to fulﬁl all of the following criteria
Final
outcome
1 The disease is not present in the territory of the Union OR present only in exceptional
cases (irregular introductions) OR present in only in a very limited part of the territory of
the Union
N
2.1 The disease is highly transmissible N
2.2 There be possibilities of airborne or waterborne or vector-borne spread Y
2.3 The disease affects multiple species of kept and wild animals OR single species of kept
animals of economic importance
Y
2.4 The disease may result in high morbidity and signiﬁcant mortality rates N
At least one criterion to be met by the disease:
In addition to the criteria set out above at point 1–2.4, the disease needs to fulﬁl at least one of the following
criteria
3 The disease has a zoonotic potential with signiﬁcant consequences on public health,
including epidemic or pandemic potential OR possible signiﬁcant threats to food safety
N
4(CI) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on the economy of the Union, causing substantial
costs, mainly related to its direct impact on the health and productivity of animals
N
4(PI) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on the economy of the Union, causing substantial
costs, mainly related to its direct impact on the health and productivity of animals
N
5(a)(CI) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on society, with in particular an impact on labour
markets
N
5(a)(PI) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on society, with in particular an impact on labour
markets
N
5(b) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on animal welfare, by causing suffering of large
numbers of animals
N
5(c) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on the environment, due to the direct impact of the
disease OR due to the measures taken to control it
N
5(d) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on a long-term effect on biodiversity or the
protection of endangered species or breeds, including the possible disappearance or
long-term damage to those species or breeds
N
Colour code: green = consensus (Yes/No)
Table 17: Outcome of the expert judgement related to the criteria of section 2 of Annex IV
(category B of Article 9) for LPAI (CI = current impact; PI = potential impact)
Criteria to be met by the disease:
The disease needs to fulﬁl all of the following criteria
Final
outcome
1 The disease is present in the whole OR part of the Union territory with an endemic
character AND (at the same time) several Member States or zones of the Union are free
of the disease
N
2.1 The disease is moderately to highly transmissible Y
2.2 There be possibilities of airborne or waterborne or vector-borne spread Y
2.3 The disease affects single or multiple species Y
2.4 The disease may result in high morbidity with in general low mortality Y
At least one criterion to be met by the disease:
In addition to the criteria set out above at point 1–2.4, the disease needs to fulﬁl at least one of the following
criteria
3 The disease has a zoonotic potential with signiﬁcant consequences on public health,
including epidemic potential OR possible signiﬁcant threats to food safety
N
4(CI) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on the economy of the Union, causing substantial
costs, mainly related to its direct impact on the health and productivity of animals
N
4(PI) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on the economy of the Union, causing substantial
costs, mainly related to its direct impact on the health and productivity of animals
N
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5(a)(CI) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on society, with in particular an impact on labour
markets
N
5(a)(PI) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on society, with in particular an impact on labour
markets
N
5(b) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on animal welfare, by causing suffering of large
numbers of animals
N
5(c) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on the environment, due to the direct impact of the
disease OR due to the measures taken to control it
N
5(d) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on a long-term effect on biodiversity or the
protection of endangered species or breeds, including the possible disappearance or
long-term damage to those species or breeds
N
Colour code: green = consensus (Yes/No)
Table 18: Outcome of the expert judgement related to the criteria of section 3 of Annex IV
(category C of Article 9) for LPAI (CI = current impact; PI = potential impact)
Criteria to be met by the disease:
The disease needs to fulﬁl all of the following criteria
Final
outcome
1 The disease is present in the whole OR part of the Union territory with an endemic
character
Y
2.1 The disease is moderately to highly transmissible Y
2.2 The disease is transmitted mainly by direct or indirect transmission Y
2.3 The disease affects single or multiple species Y
2.4 The disease usually does not result in high morbidity and has negligible or no mortality
AND often the most observed effect of the disease is production loss
Y
At least one criterion to be met by the disease:
In addition to the criteria set out above at point 1–2.4, the disease needs to fulﬁl at least one of the following
criteria
3 The disease has a zoonotic potential with signiﬁcant consequences on public health, or
possible signiﬁcant threats to food safety
N
4(CI) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on the economy of the Union, mainly related to its
direct impact on certain types of animal production systems
N
4(PI) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on the economy of the Union, mainly related to its
direct impact on certain types of animal production systems
Y
5(a)(CI) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on society, with in particular an impact on labour
markets
N
5(a)(PI) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on society, with in particular an impact on labour
markets
N
5(b) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on animal welfare, by causing suffering of large
numbers of animals
N
5(c) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on the environment, due to the direct impact of the
disease OR due to the measures taken to control it
N
5(d) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on a long-term effect on biodiversity or the
protection of endangered species or breeds, including the possible disappearance or
long-term damage to those species or breeds
N
Colour code: green = consensus (Yes/No)
Table 19: Outcome of the expert judgement related to the criteria of section 4 of Annex IV
(category D of Article 9) for LPAI
Criteria to be met by the disease:
The disease needs to fulﬁl all of the following criteria
Final
outcome
D The risk posed by the disease in question can be effectively and proportionately mitigated by
measures concerning movements of animals and products in order to prevent or limit its
occurrence and spread
N
Criteria of section 1, 2, 3 or 5 of Annex IV of AHL Y
Colour code: green = consensus (Yes/No)
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3.3.1. Outcome of the assessment of criteria in Annex IV for LPAI for the
purpose of categorisation as in Article 9 of the AHL
As from the legal text of the AHL, a disease is considered ﬁtting in a certain category (A, B, C, D or
E corresponding to point (a) to point (e) of Article 9(1) of the AHL) if it is eligible to be listed for Union
intervention as laid down in Article 5(3) and fulﬁls all criteria of the ﬁrst set from 1 to 2.4 and at least
one of the second set of criteria from 3 to 5(d) as shown in Tables 16–20. According to the
assessment methodology (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2017a,b), a criterion is considered fulﬁlled when the
outcome is ‘yes’. With respect to different type of impact where the assessment is divided into current
and potential impact, a criterion will be considered fulﬁlled if at least one of the two outcomes is ‘Y’
and, in case of no ‘Y’, the assessment is inconclusive if at least one outcome is ‘NC’.
A description of the outcome of the assessment of criteria in Annex IV for LPAI for the purpose of
categorisation as in Article 9 of the AHL is presented in Table 21.
According to the assessment here performed, LPAI complies with the following criteria of the
sections 1 to 5 of Annex IV of the AHL for the application of the disease prevention and control rules
referred to in points (a) to (e) of Article 9(1):
1) To be assigned to category A, a disease needs to comply with all criteria of the ﬁrst set
(1, 2.1–2.4) and according to the assessment LPAI complies with criteria 2.2 and 2.3 but
does not comply with criteria 1, 2.1 and 2.4. To be eligible for category A, a disease needs to
comply additionally with one of the criteria of the second set (3, 4, 5a–d) and LPAI does not
comply with any of them.
2) To be assigned to category B, a disease needs to comply with all criteria of the ﬁrst set
(1, 2.1–2.4) and according to the assessment LPAI complies with criteria 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 and
2.4 but does not comply with criterion 1. To be eligible for category A, a disease needs to
Table 21: Outcome of the assessment of criteria in Annex IV for LPAI for the purpose of
categorisation as in Article 9 of the AHL (CI = current impact; PI = potential impact)
Category
Article 9 criteria
1° set of criteria 2° set of criteria
1 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 3 4 5a 5b 5c 5d
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Table 20: Outcome of the expert judgement related to the criteria of section 5 of Annex IV
(category E of Article 9) for LPAI
Diseases in category E need to fulﬁl criteria of section 1, 2 or 3 of Annex IV of AHL and/or
the following:
Final
outcome
E Surveillance of the disease is necessary for reasons relating to animal health, animal welfare,
human health, the economy, society or the environment
(If a disease fulﬁls the criteria as in Article 5, thus being eligible to be listed, consequently
category E would apply.)
Y
Colour code: green = consensus (Yes/No)
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comply additionally with one of the criteria of the second set (3, 4, 5a–d) and LPAI does not
comply with any of them.
3) To be assigned to category C, a disease needs to comply with all criteria of the ﬁrst set
(1, 2.1–2.4) and according to the assessment LPAI complies with all. To be eligible for
category A, a disease needs to comply additionally with one of the criteria of the second set
(3, 4, 5a–d) and LPAI complies with criterion 4 and does not comply with criteria 3, 5a–5d.
4) To be assigned to category D, a disease needs to comply with criteria of section 1, 2, 3 or 5 of
Annex IV of the AHL, which LPAI complies with, and with the speciﬁc criterion D of section 4,
which LPAI does not comply with.
5) To be assigned to category E, a disease needs to comply with criteria of section 1, 2 or 3 of
Annex IV of the AHL and/or the surveillance of the disease is necessary for reasons relating
to animal health, animal welfare, human health, the economy, society or the environment.
The latter is applicable if a disease fulﬁls the criteria as in Article 5, which LPAI complies
with.
3.4. Assessment of Article 8
This section presents the results of the assessment on the criteria of Article 8(3) of the AHL about
LPAI. The Article 8(3) criteria are about animal species to be listed, as it reads below:
‘3. Animal species or groups of animal species shall be added to this list if they are affected or if
they pose a risk for the spread of a speciﬁc listed disease because:
a) they are susceptible for a speciﬁc listed disease or scientiﬁc evidence indicates that such
susceptibility is likely; or
b) they are vector species or reservoirs for that disease, or scientiﬁc evidence indicates that such
role is likely.’
For this reason, the assessment on Article 8 criteria is based on the evidence as extrapolated from
the relevant criteria of Article 7, i.e. the ones related to susceptible and reservoir species or routes of
transmission, which cover also possible role of biological or mechanical vectors.10 According to the
mapping, as presented in Table 5, section 3.2 of the scientiﬁc opinion on the ad hoc methodology
(EFSA AHAW Panel, 2017b), the main animal species to be listed for LPAI according to the criteria of
Article 8(3) of the AHL are as displayed in Table 22.
10 A vector is a living organism that transmits an infectious agent from an infected animal to a human or another animal. Vectors
are frequently arthropods. Biological vectors may carry pathogens that can multiply within their bodies and be delivered to
new hosts, usually by biting. In mechanical vectors the pathogens do not multiply within the vector, which usually remains
infected for shorter time than in biological vectors.
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Table 22: Animal species to be listed for LPAI according to criteria of Article 8 (source: data
reported in Section 3.1.1.1)
Class Order Family Genus/Species
Susceptible Aves Anseriformes Anatidae Cygnus olor,
Anas platyrhynchos,
Anas acuta,
Anas clypeata,
Branta canadensis,
Cygnus columbianus,
Anas americana,
Anas sponsa,
Anas albifrons,
Anas crecca,
Anas penelope,
Anas querquedula,
Anas strepera,
Anser anser,
Anser erythropus,
Anser fabalis,
Aythya ferina,
Aythya fuligula,
Chloephaga poliocephala,
Cygnus cygnus,
Histrionicus histrionicus,
Oxyura jamaicensis,
Tadorna tadorna
Charadriiformes Scolopacidae Arenaria interpres,
Gallinago gallinago
Laridae Leucophaeus atricilla,
Larus delawarensis,
Larus ridibundus,
Larus argentatus,
Larus marinus
Recurvirostridae Recurvirostra avosetta
Gruiformes Rallidae Fulica atra
Pelecaniformes Ardeidae Nycticorax nycticorax
Suliformes Phalacrocoracidae Phalacrocorax carbo
Galliformes Phasianidae Gallus spp.,
Meleagris spp.,
Phasianinae,
Coturnix spp.,
Anurophasis spp.,
Perdicula spp.,
Ophrysia spp.
Odontophoridae not speciﬁed
Numididae not speciﬁed
Struthioniformes Struthionidae Struthio spp. and other ratites(a)
Mammalia Artiodactyla Suidae Sus spp.
Perissodactyla Equidae Equus spp.
Carnivora Canidae Canis spp.
Felidae Felis catus
Mustelidae Not speciﬁed
Enaliarctidae Not speciﬁed
Rodentia Muridae Mus spp.,
Rattus spp.
Caviidae Cavia porcellus
Primates Not speciﬁed
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4. Conclusions
TOR 1: for each of those diseases an assessment, following the criteria laid down in Article 7 of
the AHL, on its eligibility of being listed for Union intervention as laid down in Article 5(3) of the AHL;
• According to the assessment here performed, LPAI complies with all criteria of the ﬁrst set and
with two criteria of the second set and therefore can be considered eligible to be listed for
Union intervention as laid down in Article 5(3) of the AHL.
TOR 2a: for each of the diseases which was found eligible to be listed for Union intervention, an
assessment of its compliance with each of the criteria in Annex IV to the AHL for the purpose of
categorisation of diseases in accordance with Article 9 of the AHL;
• According to the assessment here performed, LPAI meets the criteria as in Sections 3 and 5 of
Annex IV of the AHL, for the application of the disease prevention and control rules referred to
in points (c) and (e) of Article 9(1) of the AHL.
TOR 2b: for each of the diseases which was found eligible to be listed for Union intervention, a list
of animal species that should be considered candidates for listing in accordance with Article 8 of the
AHL.
• According to the assessment here performed, the animal species that can be considered to be
listed for LPAI according to Article 8(3) of the AHL are Anseriformes and Charadriiformes as well as
all domestic poultry species (chicken, turkeys and related poultry such as quail, guinea fowl and
pheasant, and ostriches) as susceptible species, and mainly Anseriformes and Charadriiformes as
reservoir species, as reported in Table 22 in Section 3.4 of the present document.
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Abbreviations
AI avian inﬂuenza
AHL Animal Health Law
ELISA enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay
HI Haemagglutination inhibition
HPAI highly pathogenic avian inﬂuenza
HPAIV highly pathogenic avian inﬂuenza virus
ICBA individual and Collective Behavioural Aggregation
IM intramuscular
IVPI intravenous pathogenicity test
LPAI low pathogenic avian inﬂuenza
LPAIV low pathogenic avian inﬂuenza virus
PCR polymerase chain reaction
ToR Terms of Reference
C&O swabs Cloacal and oropharyngeal swabs
SC Subcutaneous
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